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Abstract:
Purpose: This paper aims at defining the value creation mechanism and income distribution
strategies of  product-service integration in order to promote product-service integration of  a
firm.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper conducts researches quantitatively on the
coordination mechanism of  product-service integration by using game theory, and uses the
methods of  Shapley value and Equal growth rate to further discuss income distribution
strategies of  product-service integration.  
Findings: Product-service integration increases the total income of  a firm and the added value
of  the income δπ decreases as the unit price demand variation coefficient of  products and
services E increases, while decreases as the marginal cost of  products βP increases, decreases as
the marginal cost of  services βS increases. Moreover, th e findings suggest that both income
distribution strategies of  product-service integration based on Shapley value method and Equal
growth rate method can make the product department and service department of  a firm win-
win and realize the Pareto improvement. The choice of  what kind of  distribution strategy to
coordinate the actions between departments depends on the department playing dominant role
in the firm. Generally speaking, for a firm at the center of  market, when the product
department is the main contributor to firm income, the service department will choose the
income distribution strategy of  product-service integration based on Shapley value method;
when the service department is the main contributor to firm income, the service department
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will choose the income distribution strategy of  product-service integration based on Equal
growth rate method.
Research limitations/implications: This paper makes some strict assumptions such as
complete information, risk neutral, linear cost function and so on and the discussion is limited
to the simple relationship between product department and service department. 
Practical implications: Product-service integration enables a firm to improve its total income.
A firm should take appropriate income distribution strategies in order to promote the its
product-service integration.
Originality/value: This paper introduces game theory into the research of  product-service
integration for the first time and it has reached some valuable conclusions, which has opened
up a new field of  study in the product-service area.  
Keywords: game theory, product-service integration, shapley value, servitization
1. Introduction
Products and services are the core issues of marketing management. Due to the flourishing
and dynamic market environment, a single product can not meet the need of customers. Quite
naturally, the concept of combinations of products and services has emerged to cope with
these issues. Since the theory of three levels of products has been proposed, the researches of
academia and practice show that a tangible product added intangible services will make up an
entire product letting customers obtain satisfactory functions. As a result, the relationship
between products and services is attracting the attention of more and more scholars.
Vandermerwe and Rada (1988) firstly advanced the concept of servitization, they divided
servitization into three stages: single products or services, combinations of products and
services, a bundle of products, services, support, knowledge and self-service. Since then,
many scholars have been mainly based on the perspective of Product-dominant logic or
Service-dominant logic to investigate extensively the issues. Mathieu (2001) proposed an
original classification system: from a service supporting the product to a service supporting the
client. Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini and Kay (2009) discussed the motivity of servitization,
the methods and rules of the successful implementation of servitization. Han, Kuruzovich and
Ravichandran (2013) examined service expansion of IT product companies. Dachs, Biege,
Borowiecki, Lay Jäger and Schartinger (2014) found that service output of firms is still small
compared to the product output based on the data from the servitisation of European
manufacturing and there is a U-shaped relationship between servitisation and firm size. 
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In recent years, more and more scholars begin to focus on the issues of product-service
integration (Geum, Lee, Kang & Park, 2011b). Sundin, Lindahl, Rönnbäck, Ölundh and Östlin
(2006) believed that product-service integration is an effective strategy to meet varied and
rapidly changing customer needs. Johnstone, Dainty and Wilkinson (2009) found a key
challenge concerning integrating the product and service parts of the business to ensure
consistent delivery of a seamless value offering to customers based on an in-depth case study
of an international aerospace original equipment manufacturer. Geum, Lee, Kang & Park
(2011a) suggested a customisation framework for roadmapping product-service integration
according to the technological interface involved, and provided practical guidance in its
implementation. Park, Geuma and Lee (2012) proposed a taxonomy of integration of products
and services in the form of a dichotomy and framework of the product-service integration
cube. Parida, Sjödin, Wincent and Kohtamäki (2014) argued that the companies who have
transformed into successful product-service providers have developed key capabilities in
business model design, partner network management, integrated development process, and
service delivery network management based on the data from Swedish and Finnish frontrunner
manufacturing companies.
Previous studies on product-service integration focused on how to integrate products and
services. Scholars have proposed the concepts, theoretical framework on product-service
integration based on case study, but have paid insufficient attention to researches on the
interaction between products and services. Obviously, the coordination issues between product
departments and service departments in a firm directly affects the successful integration of
products and services. However, the existing literatures lack relevant studies on the impact of
coordination between product departments and service departments o n product-service
integration, particularly lacking studies on mathematical models of product-service integration.
As above mentioned, this paper adopts game theory to research quantitatively the
coordination mechanisms of product-service integration through the establishment of
mathematical models. The important contribution of this paper is t o introduce game theory
into the research of product-service integration for the first time and has reached some
valuable conclusions, which opens up a new field of study in the product-service area.
2. Basic models
2.1 Model assumptions
Product-service integration means that the product department collaborates with the service
department to the utmost, follows customer demand orientation, takes products and services
as an entire product to research and develop, design and produce in order to meet the
customer needs more effectively, so as to maximize the income of the firm. Supposing one
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firm is made up of one product department and one service department. The product
department is responsible for product design and production. The service department is
responsible for the design and production of services added to products and selling of products
and services (selling also can be regarded as a kind of service, thus it is placed into service
department). Thus, product-service integration is characterized by the fact that the product
department and the service department make decisions together to maximize the overall
interests of the firm. Non-integration of products and services is characterized by the fact that
the product department and the service department make decisions respectively to maximize
the interests of his own department (because modern firm management usually takes target
responsibility system management or internal accounting management of a department).
Therefore, the issue on product-service integration can be regarded as the cooperative game
problems of the product department and the service department, in this way, we can use game
theory to make optimal analysis of them (Song & Wei, 2013; Zhang, Xu & Zhang, 2014). In
order to analyze conveniently, the following assumptions might be further made:
Assumption 1: Supposing there is only one firm which supplies products and additional services
on the products in a segment of market. The firm sells products bundled with services to
customers, and customers have to buy these products and services at the same time. This
assumption is reasonable, because a firm can segment the entire market into a submarket
where there is only one firm supplying products and services required by customers by finding the
corresponding segmentation variables according to the characters of customer’s (market)
demands.
Assumption 2: In order to simplify the analysis, w e suppose the firm supply one kind of
product and one kind of additional service for customers in a segment of market. It is
essentially to take all the products and services as one kind of product and one kind of service
added to the product. Of course, the service attached to the product can be provided by
service department or through the way of service outsourcing.
Assumption 3: Supposing in a segment of market, market demand function of products and
services is Q = M – EP, where Q is the demand of products and services, M is market capacity
(namely the maximal demand of products and services), E is the unit price demand change
coefficient of products and services, P is the market price of the product and service, and
M > 0, E > 0, P > 0, Q > 0 (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2013). When market equilibrium comes, the
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supply is equal to the demand, so the output of products and services is equal to the market
demand Q.
Assumption 4: Suppose the cost function of product department as CP = C1 + BPQ, where C1
is the fixed cost of products, BP is the marginal cost of products, and C1 > 0, BP > 0 (Pindyck &
Rubinfeld, 2013).
Assumption 5: Supposing the service department is responsible for selling products and
services, namely, the product department supplies products to the service department on
settlement price P1, the service department sells products bundled with services to customers
on market price P, and P1 > 0, P > P1. This assumption accords with the practice of most
firms, in fact, the production department is responsible for the production of products,
marketing department (providing additional services to customers) is responsible for the
packaging sales of products and services in a firm.
Assumption 6: Due to limited capacity, the service department can only produce service of
the quantity Q1, according to the market needs, the service gap of the quantity Q2 are needed
to be solved by buying services provided by an external professional service firm, namely by
service outsourcing. Obviously, when market equilibrium comes, the supply is equal to the
demand, and Q1 + Q2 = Q1.
Assumption 7: Suppose the cost function of the service department as C2 = C2 + BSQ1 + P2Q2,
where C2 i s the fixed cost of the service department, BS is the marginal cost of the service
department’s producing services, P2Q2 is the cost of buying outsourcing services of the
quantity Q2 on market price P2, and C2 > 0, BS > 0, P2 > 0, P > P2 (Pindyck & Rubinfeld,
2013).
Assumption 8: Suppose the cost function of the outsourcing service firm as CW = C3 + BWQ2,
where C3 is the fixed cost of the outsourcing service firm, BW is marginal cost of outsourcing
services, and CW > 0, BW = 0 (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2013).
-1451-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1221
Assumption 9: Suppose the outsourcing service firm supply services on market price P2 which
conform to the linear supply function, we might as well suppose as P2 = BS – γQ2, where BS is
the marginal cost of the service department’s producing services, γ is the unit demand price
variation coefficient of the services, Q2 is the quantity of outsourcing services, and γ > 0. This
assumption is reasonable. The service department chooses service outsourcing only when the
cost of buying external services is below the cost of the service department’s producing
services, i.e. BSQ2 – P2Q2 ≥ 0, thus P2 ≤ BS. Because the market supply function is linear, the
assumption P2 = BS – γQ2 is reasonable.
Assumption 10: The information of the product department and the service department is
complete. Their risk preference is neutral, and their decision-making is rational.
2.2. Models
When there is no product-service integration in a firm, the product department and the service
department make decisions independently, standing in the perspective to maximize the
interests of his own department to decide input, output and price. Thus, the income functions
of the product department and the service department are as follows respectively.
The income of the product department is: 
(1)
The income of the service department is: 
(2)
Product-service integration is essentially that the product department and service department
take products and services as an entire product to research and develop, design, produce and
sell, standing in the perspective together to maximize the overall income of the firm to decide
input, output and price, so as to achieve optimal management of the firm as a whole.
Therefore, the total income function of product-service integration is expressed as:
(3)
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3. Decision-making model analysis of product-service integration in the case of non-
service outsourcing
From assumption 6, the services are only produced by the firm’s service department, so the
service output is equal to the market demand, namely Q1 = Q, Q2 = 0.
3.1. Total income when the product department and the service department make
decisions independently
From previous assumptions, the decision-making of the product department and the service
department can be seen as a two-stage non-cooperative game: on the first stage, the product
department chooses Q and P1; on the second stage, the service department determines Q and P.
Use backward induction method to solve its subgame perfect equilibrium (Benthem &
Gheerbrant, 2010):
1. The service department determines the optimal output of products and services
The service department sells products bundled with services to customers, in order to
maximize interests of its department, it will determine the optimal output on market price P
and internal settlement price P1 of the product department.
By (2):
The optimal output of products and services is:
(4)
Therefore, the service department orders products from the product department according to
the optimal output Q, namely, lets the product department produce products of the quantity Q
for the service department by internal settlement price P1.
-1453-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1221
2. The product department determines the optimal internal settlement price P1 according to
the optimal output Q determined by the service department
By (1) and (4):
The optimal internal settlement price is:
(5)
By (4) and (5), the optimal output of products and services when the product department and
the service department make decisions independently is:
(6)
Obviously, from the practical significance, Q > 0, so
(7)
3. Total income when the product department and the service department make decisions
independently
By (1) and (6), the income of the product department is:
By (2) and (6), the income of the service department is:
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Therefore, the total income when the product department and the service department make
decisions independently is:
(8)
3.2. Total income when a firm makes decisions of product-service integration
By (3):
The optimal output of products and services is:
(9)
By (3) and (8), the total income when a firm makes decisions of product-service integration is:
(10)
Proposition 1: The total income when a firm makes decisions of product-service integration is
larger than the total income when the product department and the service department make
decisions independently, and the added value of its income δπ decreases as the unit price
demand variation coefficient E increases, decreases as the marginal cost of products BP
increases and decreases as the marginal cost of services BS increases.
Proof: by (10) and (8),
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Obviously, δπ > 0, so the total income when a fi rm makes decisions of product-service
integration is larger than the total income when the product department and the service
department make decisions independently.
By (7), M – βPE – βSE > 0, so , , 
Therefore, δπ decreases as the unit price demand variation coefficient E increases, decreases
as the marginal cost of products BP increases and decreases as the marginal cost of services
BS increases.
4. Decision-making model analysis of product-service integration in the case of
service outsourcing
4.1. Total income when the product department and the service department make
decisions independently in the case of service outsourcing
According to previous assumptions, the decision-making of the product department and the
service department of a firm and an outsourcing service firm can be seen as a three-stage
non-cooperative game: on the first stage, the product department chooses Q and P1; on the
second stage, the service department determines Q and P; on the third stage, the outsourcing
service firm determines Q2 and P2.
Use backward induction method to solve its subgame perfect equilibrium (Benthem &
Gheerbrant, 2010):
1. The outsourcing service firm determine the optimal supply Q2 of services
From previous assumptions, the income of the outsourcing service firm is:
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The optimal supply of services of the outsourcing service firm is:
(11)
The optimal supply price of services of outsourcing service firm is:
(12)
Therefore, the outsourcing service firm provides services of the quantity  for the
service department of the firm by the price .
2. The service department determines the optimal output Q
The service department sells products bundled with services to customers. It will determine
the optimal output according to market price P of products and services, internal settlement
price P1 of product department and the price P2 of outsourcing service firm so as to maximize
its interests. When the market equilibrium comes, the supply is equal to the demand, so the
optimal output of products and services is equal to the market demand Q, therefore:
The optimal output of products and services is:
(13)
Therefore, the service department orders products from the product department according to
the optimal output Q, namely, let the product department produce products of the quantity Q
for the service department by internal settlement price P1.
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3. The product department determines the optimal internal settlement price P1 according to
the optimal output Q determined by the service department
By (1) and (13):
The optimal internal settlement price of products is:
(14)
By (13) and (14), the optimal output of products and services when the product department
and the service department make decisions independently is:
(15)
4. Total income when the product department and the service department make decisions
independently in the case of service outsourcing
By (1), (14) and (15), the income of the product department is:
By (2) and (14), the income of the service department is:
Therefore, the total income when the product department and the service department make
decisions independently is:
(16)
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4.2. Total income when a firm makes decisions of product-service integration in the
case of service outsourcing
By (3):
The optimal output of products and services is:
(17)
By (3) and (17), the total income when the product department and the service department
make integration decisions is:
(18)
Proposition 2: The total income when a firm makes decisions of product-service integration in
the case of service outsourcing is larger than the total income when the product department
and the service department make decisions independently.
Proof: By (18) and (16),
Obviously, δπ > 0, so the total income when a fi rm makes decisions of product-service
integration in the case of service outsourcing is larger than the total income when the product
department and the service department make decisions independently.
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Proposition 3: Service outsourcing can improve a firm’s income and the added value of the
income δπS increases as the marginal cost of services BS increases, decreases as the marginal
cost of outsourcing services BW increases, decreases as unit demand price variation coefficient
of outsourcing services γ increases.
Proof: by (18) and (10),
So, the added value δπS of the income increases as BS increases, decreases as BW increases,
decreases as γ increases.
5. Income distribution of product-service integration
Product-service integration improves the firm’s total income. In the firm management practice,
the income improvement of product-service integration is achieved because product
department collaborates with service department. Therefore, only evaluate correctly each
department’s contribution to the added total income and take reasonable income distribution,
can we ensure product-service integration is implemented successfully and is continuously
effective.
5.1. Income distribution strategy based on Shapley value method
Cooperative game theory provides versatile and simple tools to model the generation of
worth in a society and to study the “fair” or “reasonable” distribution of this worth
(Casajus & Huettner, 2014).The Shapley value is one of the most common solution concepts
of cooperative game theory,  which has been widely applied for solving reward/cost sharing
problems in Operations Research and in economic management activities (Song & Wei,
2013; Alparslan Gök, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). Shapley value method is a method to
allocate income according to the average contribution of cooperative game parties. The
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basic principle of income distribution based on Shapley value method is: Denote N = {1, 2,
…, n} an aggregate of n-person, ν(S) the income which the player subaggregate S  N
produces, ϕi(ν), i = 1, 2, ..., n the Shapley value shared by player i in the cooperation game
ν, N (namely, the income shared by player i in the cooperation game ν, N). Then, the
Shapley value of player i can be calculated by the following formula:
Where Si is all subaggregates containing player i in the aggregate N, |S| is the number of
elements in the subaggregate S, n is the number of elements in the aggregate N,
 represents the probability which player i join in the subaggregate S, ν(S\i) is
the income obtained after removing player i from the subaggregate S, ν(S) – ν(S\i)   is the
added value of the income obtained after player i join in the subaggregate S.
Based on the above analysis, product-service integration can be written as N = {1, 2}, then,
S = {1, 2, 1U2}, ν(1) = πP, ν(2) = πS, ν(1U2) = πPS. Accordingly, we can get the income
shared respectively by the product department and the service department in product-service
integration ϕ1(ν) and ϕ2(ν):
Proposition 4: Income distribution of product-service integration based on Shapley value
method realizes the Pareto improvement, namely ϕ1(ν) > πP, ϕ2(ν) > πS.
Proof: Because πPS > πP + πS,
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Thus, ϕ1(ν) > πP, ϕ2(ν) > πS, namely, the income of the product department and the service
department is increased, and the product department and the service department share
equally the added value of income of product-service integration, so as to realize the Pareto
improvement and reach a win-win situation.
5.2. Income distribution strategy based on Equal growth rate method
Product-service integration improves the firm’s total income. Denote α the income growth rate,
then
Because the product department and the service department share income in the same income
growth rate,
Because πPS > πP + πS, so π1 > πP, π2 > πS, namely the income of both product department and
service department increases. Therefore, we can reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 5: Income distribution of product-service integration based on Equal growth rate
method realizes the Pareto improvement, namely π1 > πP, π2 > πS.
5.3. Comparative analysis of different income distribution strategies
1. Comparison of income distribution strategies when the product department is the main
department
That product department is the main department means that product department is the main
contributor to the firm’s income, thus πP > πS
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Because πP > πS, πPS > πP + πS, so
ϕ1(ν) – π1 < 0, ϕ1(ν) < π1, income distribution of product-service integration based on Equal
growth rate is beneficial to product department.
ϕ2(ν) – π2 > 0, ϕ2(ν) > π2, income distribution of product-service integration based on Shapley
value is beneficial to service department.
Modern business management has become a market-centered management model. Because
service department is directly facing the market, the service department has priority over
selection of income distribution strategies. Accordingly, the service department will choose
income distribution of product-service integration based on Shapley value method so as to
maximize the income of its department. Therefore, we can reach the conclusion as follows:
Proposition 6: When product department is the main contributor to a firm’s income, the
service department will choose income distribution of product-service integration based on
Shapley value method so as to maximize the income of its department.
2. Comparison of income distribution strategies when the service department is the main
department
The service department is the main department means that the service department is the main
contributor to a firm’s income, so πS > πP
-1463-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1221
Because πS > πP, πPS > πP + πS, so
ϕ1(ν) – π1 > 0, ϕ1(ν) > π1, income distribution of product-service integration based on Shapley
value method is beneficial to the product department.
ϕ2(ν) – π2 < 0, ϕ2(ν) < π2, income distribution of product-service integration based on Equal
growth rate method is beneficial to service department.
Because the service department is the main department and the service department is directly
facing the market, the service department dominates the selection of income distribution
strategies. Thus, the service department will choose income distribution of product-service
integration based on Equal growth rate method so as to maximize the income of its
department. Therefore, we can reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 7: When the service department is the main contributor to firm income, the
service department will choose income distribution of product-service integration based on
Equal growth rate method so as to maximize the income of its department.
6. Conclusions
This paper firstly adopts game theory to study the coordination mechanism of product-service
integration. Results show that product-service integration increases the total income of a firm
and the added value of the income δπ decreases as the unit price demand variation coefficient
of products and services E increases, decreases as the marginal cost of products BP increases,
decreases as the marginal cost of services BS increases.
The study also demonstrates that service outsourcing can improve a firm’s income and the
added value of its income δπS increases as the marginal cost of services BS increases,
decreases as the marginal cost of outsourcing services BW increases, and decreases as the unit
price demand variation coefficient of outsourcing services γ increases.
In addition, the paper also makes an in-depth study on income distribution strategies of
product-service integration. Findings suggest that both income distribution strategies of
product-service integration based on Shapley value method and Equal growth rate method can
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realize the Pareto improvement and reach a win-win situation. The choice of what kind of
distribution strategy to coordinate the actions between departments depends on the
department playing dominant role in the firm. Generally speaking, when product department is
the main contributor to firm income, the service department will choose income distribution
strategy of product-service integration based on Shapley value method so as to maximize
interests of its department; when the service department is the main contributor to firm
income, the service department will choose the income distribution strategy of product-service
integration based on Equal growth rate method so as to maximize interests of its department.
In order to facilitate the analysis, this paper makes some strict assumptions, which provides
opportunity for future researches on relaxing the assumption, in-depth study of complex
relationship between products and services and so on.
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